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KYBERNET IK A — VOLUME 4 5 ( 2 0 0 9 ) , N U MBE R 5 , P AG E S 6 8 9 – 7 0 0
ON THE COMPLEXITY OF THE SHAPLEY–SCARF
ECONOMY WITH SEVERAL TYPES OF GOODS
Kataŕına Cechlárová
In the Shapley–Scarf economy each agent is endowed with one unit of an indivisible
good (house) and wants to exchange it for another, possibly the most preferred one among
the houses in the market. In this economy, core is always nonempty and a core allocation
can be found by the famous Top Trading Cycles algorithm. Recently, a modification of
this economy, containing Q ≥ 2 types of goods (say, houses and cars for Q = 2) has been
introduced. We show that if the number of agents is 2, a complete description of the core
can be found efficiently. However, when the number of agents is not restricted, the problem
to decide the nonemptyness of the core becomes NP-hard already in the case of two types
of goods. We also show that even the problem to decide whether an allocation exists in
which each agent strictly improves compared to his endowment, is NP-complete.
Keywords: Shapley–Scarf economy, core, algorithm, NP-completeness
AMS Subject Classification: 91A12, 91A06, 68Q25
1. INTRODUCTION
In the seminal paper by Shapley and Scarf [10] a special economy with indivisible
goods (the so-called housing market) was introduced. In this economy each agent
owns one unit of an indivisible unique good (house) that is specific for him and
wants to end up again with just one unit of good. The preference relation of an
agent is simply a linear ordering (possibly with ties) of a subset of houses. Under
such assumptions, a core allocation always exists, which can be proved constructively
by the Top Trading Cycles (TTC for short) algorithm due to Gale.
There are many studies of the housing market in the literature, not only because
it is interesting matematically, but also for its ability to model many real mar-
kets: large-scale exchange of government subsidized housing in China [11], matching
graduates of the United States Naval Academy to their first posts as Naval Officers
[7], assigning students to schools [1], exchange of incompatible donors of kidneys
for transplantation [8] etc. Notice that a detailed mathematical analysis helped to
change an inefficient mechanism for matching students in Boston to places at public
schools to another mechanism with better properties [1], in the other case it helped
to find suitable donors for patients on the waiting lists [8]. As in real markets the
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number of participants is usually very high, efficient algorithms are very important
for any results to be implemented. The housing market, due to its special structure,
admits such algorithms, but how important is this structure for tractability?
Konishi, Quint and Wako [6] considered a modification of the Shapley–Scarf econ-
omy with Q ≥ 2 types of indivisible goods (if Q = 2, the types may be say houses
and cars). Each agent originally owns one unit of each type of good (say one house
and one car) and wants to exchange them so as he again ends up with one unit of
each type. Preferences of agents are given as strict linear orders of Q-tuples and in
[6] they are supposed to be separable. Now, the core may be empty already in the
case of just two types of goods. For additively separable preferences Konishi, Quint
and Wako [6] proved that the core is always nonempty if the number of agents is 3
and Q = 2. In the proof they transformed the economy to the associated NTU game
and used the famous Scarf’s theorem [9]. We show that in general it is an NP-hard
problem to decide the nonemptyness of the core, even in the case Q = 2.
Pareto optimality in the housing market has also been studied. In [2] a polyno-
mial algorithm for finding a Pareto optimal allocation has been proposed and some
structural results for the set of Pareto optimal allocations have been derived. In the
view of the negative results in Section 4 of this paper, a similar achievement for the
case with several types of goods seems to be improbable.
The organization of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the used
notions. Then in Section 3 we deal with the case of just two agents and show that
the core (which is here equivalent with the set of allocations that are simultaneously
Pareto optimal and individually rational) is easy to describe. The hardness proofs
are contained in Section 4 and finally Conclusion contains some open problems and
directions for further research.
2. THE DESCRIPTION OF THE MODEL
The set of agents is denoted by A, their number by N . In the economy there are Q
types of indivisible goods and each agent a ∈ A is endowed with one, for him specific
unit of each type of good, i. e. with a Q-tuple g(a) = (g1(a), g2(a), . . . , gQ(a)). We
shall denote by Gi the set of goods of type i in the economy, i. e. Gi =
∪
a∈A gi(a)
and G = G1 × G2 × · · · × GQ. Each agent wishes to end up with a Q-tuple from
G; such Q-tuples will be called bundles and denoted by lowercase bold letters.
Each agent a ∈ A has linear preferences over bundles, i. e. a transitive and reflexive
binary relation P (a) on a subset G(a) of the set G, the set of acceptable bundles.
Notation x ºa y means that agent a prefers bundle x to bundle y. If x ºa y
and simultaneously y ºa x agent a is indifferent between bundles x and y; if
x ºa y but not y ºa x then agent a prefers bundle x to bundle y strictly. In
what follows, we shall suppose that there are no indifferences and we shall represent
agent’s preferences by a list of his acceptable bundles in the order from the most
preferred one to the least preferred one. We shall also suppose that g(a) ∈ G(a) for
each agent a ∈ A. The N -tuple of preferences (P (a), a ∈ A) will be denoted by P
and called the preference profile. The set of all possible preference profiles will be
denoted by Π. An economy is a pair E = (A,P).
With some abuse of notation, in the case of bundles we shall usually write, say
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in case Q = 4, instead of (g1(a), g2(b), g3(c), g4(d)) simply (a, b, c, d), as no confusion
should arise.
An allocation is a function X : A → G, i. e. x(a) = (x1(a), x2(2), . . . , xQ(a)), such
that xi(a) 6= xi(b) for each i = 1, 2, . . . , Q and each a, b ∈ A, a 6= b. An allocation X
is individually rational, if x(a) ∈ G(a) for each agent a ∈ A.
Definition 1. A coalition S ⊆ A blocks an allocation X if there exists an allocation
Y such that






Definition 2. An allocation X is in the core of economy E if no coalition blocks
it and it is said to be Pareto optimal for economy E if A does not block it.
The set of all core allocations of economy E will be denoted by Core(E).
Konishi, Quint and Wako [6] proved in Proposition 2.1 that Core(E) 6= ∅ for
each economy with N = 3, Q = 2. However, they assumed that the agents’
preferences are additively separable, i. e. each agent a has Q utility functions
uai : Gi → R, i = 1, 2, . . . , Q such that a prefers bundle x = (x1, x2, . . . , xQ) to








i (yi). Already with
N = 4 the core may be empty (see Example 2.3 in [6]) even with additively sep-
arable preferences. Here we show that the assumption of additive separability in
Proposition 2.1 of [6] is crucial.
Example 1. Consider economy E with three agents and two types of goods with
the following preferences:
P (a) : (a, b), (c, a), (a, a)
P (b) : (c, b), (b, a), (b, b)
P (c) : (a, c), (b, c), (c, c)
To show that no allocation X = (x(a), x(b),x(c)) can be in Core(E), consider three
cases.
(i) If x(a) = (a, b), then necessarily x(b) = (b, a). Then x(c) = (c, c) and coalition
{b, c} is blocking via y(b) = (c, b) and y(c) = (b, c).
(ii) If x(a) = (c, a), then agent b must receive bundle (b, b). But then coalition
{a, b} is blocking by assigning bundles (a, b) and (b, a) to agents a, b, respec-
tively.
(iii) Finally, if x(a) = (a, a), then agent c cannot obtain x(c) = (a, c), so coalition
{a, c} is blocking via y(a) = (c, a) and y(c) = (a, c).
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3. TWO–AGENTS ECONOMIES
Let A = {a, b} and let Q be arbitrary. We will show that in case of two agents the
complete core of the economy can be generated by a simple algorithm.
For a bundle x ∈ G we shall denote by x its complement, i. e. xi = a implies
xi = b and xi = b implies xi = a for all i = 1, 2, . . . , Q. Suppose that the preferences
of agents are of the following form
P (a) : x1, x2, . . . , xk
P (b) : y1, y2, . . . , y`
and consider algorithm CoreN2 given in Figure 1.
Input: Economy E = (A, P) with |A| = 2.
Output: Reduced preference lists P ′(a), P ′(b).
1. begin denote all entries in P (b) as unlabelled;
2. for i = 1, . . . , k do if xi /∈ P (b) then delete xi from P (a) else label xi in P (b);
3. delete all unlabelled entries from P (b);
4. denote all entries in P (b) as unlabelled;
5. for i = 1, 2, . . . , k do if xi ∈ P (a) then
6. begin label xi;
7. for each yj ∈ P (b) do
8. if yj is written after xi in P (b) and unlabelled then
9. delete yj from P (b) and yj from P (a)
10. end;
11. end
Fig. 1. Algorithm CoreN2.
Example 2. Let Q = 4 and the preference lists of agents a and b be
P (a) : (a, b, a, b), (b, b, b, b), (a, a, b, b), (a, b, b, b), (a, a, a, a)
P (b) : (b, a, a, a), (a, b, b, a), (b, a, b, a), (a, b, b, b), (b, a, a, b), (b, b, b, b)
(so k = 5 and ` = 6). In line 2 of the algorithm, bundles (b, b, b, b), (a, a, b, b)
are deleted from P (a) and in P (b) bundles (b, a, b, a), (b, a, a, a) and (b, b, b, b) are
labelled. Then in line 3, bundles (a, b, b, a), (a, b, b, b) and (b, a, a, b) are deleted from
P (b). We are left with the lists
P (a) : (a, b, a, b), (a, b, b, b), (a, a, a, a)
P (b) : (b, a, a, a), (b, a, b, a), (b, b, b, b)
Then, for (a, b, a, b) in P (a), bundle (b, a, b, a) is labelled in P (b) and bundles (b, b, b, b)
and (a, a, a, a) are deleted from P (b) and P (a), respectively. Finally, for bundle
(a, b, b, b) in P (a), bundle (b, a, a, a) is labelled in P (b), but nothing is deleted, as
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the only bundle (b, a, b, a) appearing after it in P (b) is labelled. Finally, Core(E)
contains two allocations
X1 = ((a, b, a, b), (b, a, b, a)) and X2 = ((a, b, b, b), (b, a, a, a)).
Now we argue that Algorithm CoreN2 is correct.
Theorem 1. If Algorithm CoreN2 results in both preference lists being empty
then Core(E) = ∅. Otherwise Core(E) is equal to the set of all allocations of the
form (x,x) for x ∈ P ′(a).
P r o o f . First we show that no bundle that was deleted in the course of Algorithm
CoreN2 can be a part of a core allocation. This is clear for the bundles deleted in
lines 2 and 3 of the algorithm, as their complements are not acceptable for the other
agent. Now suppose that bundle y was deleted from P (b) in line 9 of the algorithm;
suppose that this happened because of xi ∈ P (a). But this means that agent b
prefers xi to y. Moreover, since y was not labelled before, y is not a complement
for any of the bundles xj , j < i and so agent a prefers xi to y. Thus allocation
(y, y) cannot be in the core of E .
Conversely, if x ∈ P ′(a), it is easy to see that (x,x) ∈ Core(E), as for any other
allocation (y, y) either agent a prefers x to y of agent b prefers x to y. ¤
The complexity estimation of Algorithm CoreN2 can be obtained as follows. In
line 2 it is necessary, for each xi in P (a), to scan the whole preference list P (b).
This gives O(k`) operations. Lines 3 and 4 need O(`) operations each and lines 5–10
again O(k`) operations. As the length of each preference list is at most 2Q, the
complexity bound of Algoritm CoreN2 is O(22Q), but this is still polynomial in the
size of the representation of the economy.
4. NP–HARD PROBLEMS
In our transformations showing NP-completeness of some problems, we shall use a
variant of Satisfiability, called R3-sat, see e. g. [3]. In an instance of R3-sat a
boolean formula B in CNF is given, such that each clause contains exactly 3 literals
and each variable appears in B exactly twice nonnegated and exactly twice negated.
The question is whether B is satisfiable.
For each instance B of R3-sat with clauses C1, C2, . . . , Cm and variables v1, v2, . . . ,
vn we construct an econonomy EB with a special structure. The agents will be di-
vided into n variable cells EB(vj) and m clause cells EB(Ci). In a variable cell EB(vj),
agents p1j and p
2
j will correspond to the first and to the second occurrence of literal




j to the first and to the second occurrence of literal vj . In the
clause cell EB(Ci) agents c1i , c2i , c3i correspond to the first, second and third position
in Ci.
We will also use the notation c(a) for a ∈ {p1j , p2j , q1j , q2j } to denote the clause
agent corresponding to the position in the formula containing the associated literal,
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and conversely, v(a) for a ∈ {c1i , c2i , c3i } will denote the variable agent corresponding
to the particular occurrence of a variable in the associated position.
For example, let
C3 = v1 + v2 + v3
and for v1 let this be its second occurence, and for v2 and v3 let these be their first
























We shall say that an agent a is linking in allocation X , if x(a) contains some good
originally owned by an agent not belonging to the cell of agent a.
4.1. Core of the economy
Let us consider the problem
core existence
Instance. An economy E .
Question. Does E admit a core allocation?
Theorem 2. Problem core existence is NP-hard already in the case when Q = 2
and agents have strict preferences over bundles.
P r o o f . In the polynomial transformation, econonomy EB constructed for an
instance B of R3-sat with clauses C1, C2, . . . , Cm and variables v1, v2, . . . , vn will
have N = 4m + 6n agents and Q = 2.
Variable cell EB(xj) consists of 6 agents p1j , p2j , q1j , q2j , r1j , r2j and clause cell EB(Ci)




i , zi. Preferences of agents of EB are given in Figures 2
and 3.






























































































Fig. 2. Preferences of agents of a variable cell.
Now we derive the properties of core allocations in variable and clause cells.
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Fig. 3. Preferences of agents of a clause cell.
Lemma 1. Let X be a core allocation. Then in each variable cell EB(vj), allocation
X can behave in only one of the two ways, either
p1j → (r1j , p2j ); p2j → (r2j , p1j ); r1j → (p2j , r2j ); r2j → (p1j , r1j )
(this will be called the X 1j case), or
q1j → (r1j , q2j ); q2j → (r2j , q1j ); r1j → (q2j , r2j ); r2j → (q1j , r1j )
which will be called the X 2j case in what follows.
P r o o f . Clearly, any allocation X that is not blocked by any coalition must be
individually rational. Now consider several cases for X .
• Case 1. Suppose that x(r1j ) = (r1j , r1j ). Then necessarily x(r2j ) = (r2j , r2j ) and






j is assigned his first choice bun-
dle. But then X is blocked e. g. by coalition {p1j , p2j , r1j , r2j } assigned bundles
according to X 1j . (In the case x(r2j ) = (r2j , r2j ) the argument is symmetric.)
• Case 2. Suppose that both r-agents are assigned their second choice bundles,




j ) and x(r
2




j ). Then x(p
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j cannot be assigned their first
and second choice bundles and they will form a blocking coalition by helping
themselves to the bundles (p2j , q
1





• Case 3. Now suppose that both r-agents are assigned their first choice bundles,




j ) and x(r
2




j ). Then we have x(p
2













j cannot be assigned their first and
second choice bundles and they will form a blocking coalition by exchanging
their endowments to get the bundles (p1j , q
2





Hence necessarily one of the r-agents has his first choice bundle and the other one




j ) and x(r
2





Then the only available bundles for players p1j and p
2
j are their first choice bundles,
i. e. (r1j , p
2




j ). This leads to the allocation X 1j .




j ) and x(r
2




j ) leads to
the allocation X 2j . ¤
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Lemma 2. If X is a core allocation, then in each clause cell EB(Ci), x(cki ) =
(cki , v(c
k
i )) for at least one agent c
k
i , k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
P r o o f . First suppose that g2(v(c
k
i )) is unavailable for all agents in EB(Ci).
Then in fact, the agents of EB(Ci) have to consider the reduced preference lists
given in Figure 4.
P (c1i ) : (zi, c
1
























P (c3i ) : (c
3









P (zi) : (c
3






i , zi), (zi, zi)
Fig. 4. Reduced preferences of agents of a clause cell.
The reduced economy E ′ of Figure 4 is in fact identical with the economy con-
structed by Konishi, Quint and Wako in [6, Example 2.3.], which has no core allo-
cation. To be self contained, we repeat here the argument from [6]. There are only
four individually rational allocations for E ′, namely
Y1i : c1i → (c1i , c1i ); c2i → (c2i , c2i ); c3i → (c3i , c3i ); zi → (zi, zi)
Y2i : c1i → (c1i , c1i ); c2i → (c2i , c3i ); c3i → (c3i , c2i ); zi → (zi, zi)
Y3i : c1i → (zi, c2i ); c2i → (c1i , c1i ); c3i → (c3i , c3i ); zi → (c2i , zi)
Y4i : c1i → (c1i , c1i ); c2i → (c2i , c2i ); c3i → (zi, zi); zi → (c3i , c3i )
Allocation Y1i is blocked by coalition {c2i , c3i } via allocation Y2i , allocation Y2i is
blocked by coalition {c1i , c2i , zi} via allocation Y3i , allocation Y3i is blocked by coalition
{c3i , zi} via allocation Y4i and finally allocation Y4i is blocked by coalition {c2i , c3i }
via allocation Y2i . ¤




i is linking and for the other c-
agents of EB(Ci) the good g2(v(cki )) is unavailable, then there exists an assignment
of bundles to agents of EB(Ci) such that no agent from EB(Ci) can be in a blocking
coalition.
P r o o f . It is easy to verify that the sought assignments are
• if all c-agents are linking, let x(zi) = (zi, zi),
• if both c1i and c3i or both c2i and c3i are linking, assign to the remaining agents
the bundles as in Y1i ;
• if both c1i and c2i or c2i only are linking, assign to the remaining agents the
bundles as defined by Y4i ;
• if only c1i is linking, remaining agents will be assigned the bundles as in Y2i ;
and finally
• if only c3i is linking, remaining agents will be assigned the bundles as in Y3i .¤
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Now suppose that formula B is satisfied by a truth assignment f . Let us create
allocation X by assigning bundles to agents in the following way:
(i) If vj is true in f , set x(p
1










j )) and the remaining
agents of EB(vj) will get the bundles according to allocation X 2j .
(ii) If vj is false in f , set x(q
1










j )) and the remaining
agents of EB(vj) will get the bundles according to allocation X 1j .
(iii) Assign to each agent cki corresponding to a position of a true literal in B the
bundle (cki , v(c
k
i )). Since B is true in f , in each EB(Ci) at least one of the
agents cki gets this bundle and for the remaining agents of EB(Ci) the good
g2(v(c
k
i ))) is not available due to (i) and (ii), so a core allocation exists due to
Lemma 3.
So we have a core allocation for the constructed economy.
Conversely, let X be a core allocation for economy EB . Then X acts on any variable
cell EB(vj) according either to allocation X 1j or to allocation X 2j (Lemma 1). In the
former case set vj to be false and in the latter case to be true. Further, Lemma 2
implies that in each clause cell EB(Ci) at least one agent cki is linking – and it is
easy to see that this agent will correspond to a true literal. So B is satisfied. ¤
4.2. Pareto optimal allocations
Problem better allocation.
Instance. An economy E .
Question. Does E admit an allocation Y such that y(a) Âa g(a) for
each agent a ∈ A?
Theorem 3. Problem better allocation is NP-complete even in the case Q = 2.
P r o o f . We again use a polynomial transformation from R3-sat. Econonomy
EB will have N = 6m + 5n agents.
Variable cell EB(vj) consists of 5 agents p1j , p2j , q1j , q2j , rj and clause cell EB(Ci)









Preferences of agents of EB are given in Figures 5 and 6. In Figure 6 the symbol




i) for k, ` = 1, 2, 3, k 6= ` in any strict order and
the symbol (zi, Yi) represents all the bundles (zi, c
k
i ) for k = 1, 2, 3 in any strict




i ) if the k
th position
of Ci is the first occurrence of a particular literal, or equivalently if v(c
k
i ) is equal to
p1j or to q
1
j . Similarly, V (c
k




i )) if the k
th position of Ci
is the second occurrence of a particular literal, which happens if v(cki ) is equal to p
2
j
or to q2j .
Now we show that E admits an allocation Y such that y(a) Âa g(a) for each
agent a ∈ A if and only if B is satisfiable.
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Fig. 5. Preferences of agents of a variable cell.
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i , zi), (zi, c
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i ) for k = 1, 2, 3
P (zi) : C
2
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Fig. 6. Preferences of agents of a clause cell.
First, let B be satisfied by a truth assignment f . Let us construct allocation Y
in the following way: If vj is true, we set











y(q1j ) = (q
1
j , rj); y(q
2
j ) = (rj , q
2





and if vj is false, we have











y(p1j ) = (p
1
j , rj); y(p
2
j ) = (rj , p
2





In each clause cell EB(Ci) we assign y(cki ) = V (cki ) for each agent cki that corresponds
to a position containing true literal. Since each clause is satisfied by f , either one,
two or all three c-agents of in EB(Ci) are already assigned. For the other agents of
EB(Ci) do the following. If just one c-agent, say cki , has not yet been assigned, put
y(cki ) = (c
k















If two c-agents, say cki and c
`
i , have not yet been assigned, put
y(cki ) = (c
k
i , zi); y(c
`



















If all the c-agents have been assigned, put










i ) = (t
2
i , zi).
Clearly, all agents have improved compared to their endowments.
Now suppose that there exists an allocation Y in which all agents a ∈ A strictly
prefer the bundle y(a) to the bundle g(a). Then since in each clause cell EB(Ci), at
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most two c-agents can improve by getting the good of agent zi, at least one of them,
say cki will be linking, i. e. receive the bundle V (c
k
i ). Now let us look at EB(vj). If
agent p1j or agent p
2





so neither agent q1j nor agent q
2
j can be linking. Similarly, if agent q
1
j or agent q
2
j is




j ), and so neither agent p
1
j nor
agent p2j can be linking. Now it is clear that when setting vj true in the former case
and vj false in the latter case, the truth assignment will be consistent and formula
B satisfied. ¤
Problem po-test
Instance. An economy E and an allocation X for E .
Question. Is X not Pareto optimal for E?
Corollary 4.1. Problem po-test is NP-complete even in the case Q = 2.
P r o o f . The statement of the corollary is implied by Theorem 3, as problem
po-test is a special case of better allocation. ¤
5. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
The results of this paper contribute to a better understanding of the computational
complexity issues arising in markets with indivisible goods. They show that the
polynomiality results for Shapley–Scarf economy are very much dependent from its
special structure. As a complement to hardness results of [4] implied by equivalence
of goods owned by some agents we show that it is NP-hard to decide the nonempty-
ness of the core of the economy and Pareto optimality of a given allocation if agents
are allowed to own only one unit of several types of goods.
As this is the first paper dealing with computational complexity in this model,
there are still many open questions and here we suggest at least some of them.
1. The size of the description of the economy grows exponentially with the number
of types of goods, since the preference list of an agent can contain up to NQ
entries. Are there some interesting cases with a succinct representation? One
possibility is suggested in [6]: for a complete description of additively separable
preferences, just N2Q numbers are needed (utility values of each agent for each
good). However, additively separable preferences form a relatively small class,
moreover, even for them the complexity of the core existence problem is not
resolved. Another possibility would be to consider a different form of separable
preferences, e. g. obtained by extending linear orderings of goods of one type
to preferences over bundles in some way.
2. A competitive equilibrium of an economy is a pair of two objects: prices for
each good and an allocation such that each agent is assigned the best bundle
(according to his preferences) he can afford at the current prices, when he sells
his endowment. Konishi, Quint and Wako [6] constructed an example that does
not admit any competetive equilibrium (Example 3.3), but the complexity of
the existence problem for the competitive equilibrium remains open.
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3. Even if the number of agents N as well as the number of types of goods Q are
very small, the number of different ecomomies is huge: for N = 3 and Q = 2
it is equal to (9!)3. The proof of core nonemptyness for this case presented in
[6] (Proposition 2.1) uses a detour through NTU games and the deep Scarf’s
Theorem. It would be very interesting to find a purely combinatorial proof of
this assertion.
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